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Case Note

No Cure for a Broken Heart
Davis v. Districtof Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
In November 1996, Michael Lee Davis, an inmate at D.C. Central
Prison at Lorton, Virginia, was taken to the hospital by ambulance. At a
prison checkpoint, a guard named Dwight Bynum entered the vehicle,
recognized Davis, and read his sealed medical file, which noted that Davis
was infected with HIV. The two men, it seems, had mutual acquaintances
outside of Lorton. During the three days Davis spent in the hospital, Bynum
told several of Davis's friends that Davis had AIDS. Word reached Davis's
fiancre, and by the time he returned to prison, their relationship was over.1
Davis filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit pro se for the violation of his
constitutional right to privacy, seeking $1.5 million in compensatory and
punitive damages. The district court dismissed the claim sua sponte, relying
on a section of the newly enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
entitled "Limitation on Recovery": "No Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of physical injury." 2
Davis challenged this physical injury requirement on equal protection
grounds, but in Davis v. District of Columbia3 the D.C. Circuit held that
there is no cure for a broken heart. The court reasoned that, even assuming
that Davis had suffered a violation of fundamental privacy rights,4 the

1. See Brief of Appellant at 1-2, Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) (West Supp. 1999) (amending the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act).
3. 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
4. See id. at 1345 ("Here the central claim is that Davis's right to privacy is a 'fundamental
right' .. . and that it was unconstitutionally invaded when Corporal Bynum broke the seal on his
file and disclosed his medical condition to outsiders. We will assume as much for the purposes of
irgument.").
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physical injury requirement is not subject to strict scrutiny.' The court
construed the requirement to deny prisoners damages remedies only. Under
this construction, because declaratory and injunctive relief remained open
to prisoners, the provision had only a "marginal and incidental" effect on
their constitutional rights and therefore did not warrant a heightened
standard of review.' The court upheld the physical injury requirement as
being rationally related to the government's interest in "cutting back
meritless prisoner litigation," 7 and Davis's claim was dismissed with
prejudice.
This Case Note argues that the Davis court erred by its own terms in
failing to apply strict scrutiny to the physical injury requirement. Rather
than being a marginal burden on Davis's privacy rights, the physical injury
requirement dispositively burdened them, as it would for any right that can
only be remedied retrospectively. Declaratory or injunctive relief would
never vindicate Davis's rights-not because the violation of them was
trivial, but rather because it was unlikely to be repeated and because the
lasting harm from the violation could not be discontinued. The court's
reasoning makes an implicit judgment about the relative values of different
rights, a judgment not far removed from overtly redrawing constitutional
boundaries.
Much of the Davis court's reasoning takes its cue from a statute that
wrongly assumes that meritorious and nonmeritorious claims can be
distinguished on the basis of physical injury. As cases such as Davis
construe the PLRA narrowly in order to find it constitutional, a misguided
statute is generating a body of case law that goes beyond legitimating the
psychological abuse of inmates. Courts may read the physical injury
requirement to limit only monetary remedies, but there are rights that, when
violated, almost never yield physical injuries and can only be vindicated
with a damages remedy. Davis raises the question of whether such rights
have any value at all.

The PLRA's sponsors envisioned that the statute would "take the
frivolity out of frivolous inmate litigation." 8 Introducing the legislation on
the Senate floor, Bob Dole declared that prisoners brought tens of
thousands of claims each year over such trivial issues as "insufficient
storage locker space, a defective haircut by a prison barber, the failure of

5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 1347.
Id. at 1346-47.
Id at 1347.
141 CONG. REc. S14,414 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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prison officials to invite a prisoner to a pizza party for a departing prison
employee, and yes, being served chunky peanut butter instead of the
creamy variety." 9 As one of numerous provisions in the PLRA designed to
take away prisoners' incentives to litigate,1" the physical injury requirement
has provided the basis for many dismissals of prisoner claims."
Even though supporters of the PLRA maintained that the act would not
affect meritorious litigation, 2 the broad language of the physical injury
requirement has raised concern among commentators that legitimate
constitutional claims would be shut out of court.' 3 No court has invalidated
the physical injury requirement, but many courts have construed it
narrowly. 4 The most significant narrowing interpretation appeared in the

9. Id. at S14,413.
10. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring that courts narrowly
tailor prospective relief to the rights violation in need of correction); id. § 3626(f) (limiting fees
for attorneys and special masters); 28 id. § 1346(b)(2) (adding a physical injury requirement to the
Federal Tort Claims Act); id. §§ 1915(g), 1932 (penalizing prisoners for bringing frivolous or
malicious lawsuits); id. § 1915A (mandating sua sponte dismissal of meritless claims); 42 id.
§ 1997e(d) (limiting attorney's fees).
11. See, e.g., Valentino v. Jacobson, No. 97 Civ. 7615 (WK), 1999 WL 14685, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1999) (dismissing a psychological injury claim brought by a prisoner who was
kept in solitary confinement for 12 days after his administrative sentence expired); Singleton v.
Alameda County Sheriffs Dep't, No. C 98-4037 VRW, 1998 WL 754593, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
26, 1998) (dismissing a claim for "severe emotional trauma" brought by an inmate who was
forced out of bed to take his medication while he was feeling dizzy); Hobson v. DeTella, No 96C3800, 1997 WL 619822, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1997) (cautioning a plaintiff that 1997e(e) will
not sustain an emotional distress claim stemming from a strip search in front of female prison
personnel).
12. See 141 CoNG. REc. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I do
not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims. This legislation will not prevent those
claims from being raised."); 141 CONG. REc. H1563 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Canady).
13. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DuKE L.J. 1, 66 n.325 (1997) ("Read as a limitation on remedies rather than an
elimination of a cause of action, the statutory provision appears to deprive those subject to cruel
psychological punishment (for example, extreme sexual harassment) of their only effective
remedy; neither nominal damages nor injunctive relief would seem sufficient for someone who
has suffered such punishment."); Stacey Heather O'Bryan, Note, Closing the Courthouse Door:
The Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement on the
ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners,83 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1202-11 (1997); Julie M. Riewe, Note,
The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison
LitigationReform Act of 1995,47 DUKE L.J. 117, 153 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Robinson v. Page, No. 96-4239, 1999 WL 138746, at *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 16,
1999) ("It would be a serious mistake to interpret section 1997e(e) to require a showing of
physical injury in all prisoner civil rights suits. The domain of the statute is limited to suits in
which mental or emotional injury is claimed."); Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 493-94 (10th Cir.
1998) (prohibiting retroactive application of the physical injury requirement to cases brought
before the PLRA's enactment); Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that First Amendment violations do not constitute "mental or emotional injury" for the purposes
of the physical injury requirement); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that 1997e(e) does not apply to suits brought by former prisoners); Mason v. Schriro, No. 974305-CV-C-5, 1999 WL 167001, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 1999) ("Given the legislative focus on
frivolous lawsuits relating to conditions of confinement... it does not appear likely that Congress
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Seventh Circuit's widely cited opinion, Zehner v. Trigg. 5 In Zehner, the
court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by inmates who had been
exposed to asbestos while working in the prison kitchen. The court held that
the physical injury requirement only limits a prisoner's ability to win
damages and does not affect the ability to get injunctive and declaratory
relief. This reading of the requirement "beg[an] from the premise that
'Congress may not effectively nullify the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution by prohibiting all remedies for the violation of those rights.'"16
In fact, Zehner's holding did not prohibit any remedies available to the
plaintiffs-with few exceptions, courts have held that no claim exists for
emotional distress in cases of mere exposure to asbestos. 17 Because the
Zehner plaintiffs could have brought claims for equitable relief, the court
held that the physical injury requirement did not sufficiently burden a
fundamental right to merit strict scrutiny."8
In Zehner, the plaintiffs lost none of the remedies available to them
when the court read the physical injury requirement to eliminate damages
but not prospective remedies. The same reading in Davis foreclosed the
only remedies available to the plaintiff; equitable relief would do no good
for the victim of a one-time violation of privacy. By reviewing the physical
injury requirement under rational basis scrutiny, even for constitutional
claims that injunctive and declaratory relief could never plausibly redress,
the Davis court interpreted the requirement to allow Congress to prohibit all
effective remedies for the violation of a fundamental right-precisely the
result that Zehner declared it could not reach.

intended an expansive interpretation of section 1997e(e)-one that would disturb the existing and
well-settled constitutional jurisprudence relating to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claims.").
15. 133 F.3d459 (7th Cir. 1997).
16. Il at 461 (quoting Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318, 1329 (S.D. Ind. 1997)). Zehner's
limitation of the physical injury requirement to damages claims does not derive from the plain
meaning of the statutory text-rather, the decision is an effort to avoid the serious constitutional
questions that would arise from an interpretation affecting all remedies for rights violations. See
Zehner, 952 F. Supp. at 1329 (quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988), to support the
idea that courts should not interpret a statute to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims
absent a clear statement of congressional intent).
17. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1997) (noting the
concern in the case law that allowing recovery for exposure alone might drain limited resources
that should be preserved for people who get asbestos-related illnesses years from now).
The Zehnercourt kept its holding steeped in this case law. See Zehner, 133 F.3d at 461, 463
(citing Puthe v. Exxon Shipping Co., 2 F.3d 480, 484 (2d Cir. 1993), and Buckley, 521 U.S. at

424). Within this context, the district court understandably -found that "[t]here is a point beyond
which Congress may not restrict the availability of judicial remedies for the violations of
constitutional rights without in essence taking away the rights themselves by rendering them
utterly hollow promises. That point has not been reached by the enactment of § 1997e(e) as
applied here." Zehner, 952 F. Supp. at 1331.
18. See Zehner, 133 F.3d at 462-63.

1999]

Case Note

2455

II
In rejecting strict scrutiny, Davis misinterpreted precedent. The court
relied on Lyng v. Castillo,19 in which the plaintiffs had alleged that
amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964 violated fundamental rights to
free association by favoring nuclear families over more distantly related or
unrelated groups of people. The Supreme Court declined to apply strict
scrutiny because the law did not "directly and substantially" burden rights
to association: "It is exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose
to live apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps, for the cost
of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the incremental value of
the additional stamps."2 0 Following this logic, the Davis court assumed that
inmates could get injunctive or declaratory relief for most violations of
privacy rights. As a result, the physical injury requirement does not
"directly and substantially" interfere with constitutional rights; thus, strict
scrutiny was not applied: "That Davis is not among the plaintiffs whose
claims survive speaks more to the slightness of his injury than to any great
severity in the congressional curtailment of remedies."2 1
Lyng v. Castillo's use of the "direct and substantial" test, however,
does not translate seamlessly to the situation in Davis. People affirmatively
exercise the right to association, and an infinite number of factors will
affect the precise manner in which they choose to fulfill that right. If a law
decreasing food stamps benefits changes how people associate, so might
any number of other laws-housing regulations, zoning ordinances, the tax
code-and so might rising rents. The "direct and substantial" test reflects
the difference between affecting rights and foreclosing them-a law does
not merit strict scrutiny review just because it happens to alter people's
choices and incentives.
But Davis had no choice about the violation of his privacy rights.
Unlike the right to association, the right to privacy is not a right to do
something; it is a right to be free from something. Privacy rights-like
Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights-guarantee a general legal scheme to
deter violations and, ideally, a retrospective remedy in the event that such a
violation should occur.2 2 Read as a limitation on recovery, the physical
19. 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
20. Id. at 638.
21. Davis, 158 F.3d at 1347.
22. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1788 (1991). Of course, the Constitution does
not guarantee "an individually effective remedy-and certainly not a damages remedy-for every
constitutional violation." Zehner, 952 F. Supp. at 1328. Qualified immunity doctrine may prevent
the vindication of many constitutional claims; nevertheless, the implications of Davis would
exceed any plausible grounds for qualified immunity. The emotional distress claims that the
Constitution recognizes involve some of the most egregious misconduct by government officials.
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injury requirement would seem a significant burden on rights that, to a great
extent, have only one remedy. Certainly, without a damages remedy,
Davis's rights ceased to exist.
The Davis court reasoned that because many privacy claims can get
prospective relief rather than damages, the physical injury requirement only
affects a few claims and thus only marginally burdens the right.' But this
application of the "direct and substantial" test is inappropriate. Even if the
vast majority of privacy rights can be protected by injunctive relief, itself a
debatable proposition,24 the physical injury requirement will dispositivelythat is, directly and substantially-burden some heretofore cognizable
rights. By finding this effect "marginal" nonetheless, the court made an
implicit judgment about what is a bona fide violation of constitutional
rights and what is not. Refracted through Davis's "direct and substantial"
The Supreme Court's standards for excessive force claims, for example, require acts to be
"repugnant to the conscience" for them to be cognizable under the Eighth Amendment in the
absence of any physical injury. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,9-10 (citation omitted) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Such acts would never be covered by qualified
immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) ("[G]ovemment officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh
Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 54-57 (1998) (discussing the "centrality of
fault" in qualified immunity doctrine). Qualified immunity is supposed to yield a better working
government. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974). To extend immunity to
"repugnant" acts yields quite the opposite policy effect.
23. See Davis, 158 F.3d at 1347 ("Of course a constitutionally permissible curtailment of
remedies might still constitute enough of an impingement on the assumed fundamental right to
trigger strict scrutiny. But here the remaining remedies are ample.").
24. The Davis court assumed that the violations that could be remedied prospectively are
system-wide, administratively authorized infringements on privacy. Davis was not entitled to
equitable relief because "[n]ot only does Davis fail to allege any District policy leading to
Bynum's alleged conduct, but his own brief explicitly claims that the conduct violated District
rules." Id. at 1348.
Davis's situation was a one-time, possibly malicious violation of a fundamental right. Such
one-time violations seem just as common and at least as serious as systemic violations. While
systemic violations have not always yielded cognizable claims, see, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941
F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (upholding the segregation of HIV-positive inmates in Alabama
prison), the case law is settled in holding that the non-consensual, unnecessary disclosure of HIV
status is a violation of privacy rights, see, e.g., Harris, 941 F.2d at 1513 (assuming that prisoners
have a privacy right in preventing unwarranted disclosure of HIV status to other inmates and to
family members); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wisc. 1988) (finding a violation
of privacy rights where prison medical personnel unnecessarily revealed an inmate's HIV status to
prison staff and other inmates); Inmates of N.Y. State with Human Immune Deficiency Virus v.
Cuomo, No. 90-CV-252, 1991 WL 16032, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991) (" Mhe federal
Constitution protects against the unwarranted and indiscriminate disclosure of the identity of HliVinfected individuals and of their medical records .... ).
Although they do not usually rise to constitutional infringements, affronts by guards to the
dignity of prisoners are an inescapable part of prison life. See generally SOL WVACHTLER, AFrER
THE MADNESS: A JUDGE'S OWN PRISON MEMOIR 180 (1997) ("During my incarceration these
past months I have known what it is to be ignored and subjected to incredible rudeness."). That
some affronts do rise to an actionable level is entirely predictable, and they hardly seem the
"marginal and incidental" infringements that the Davis court would imagine them to be. Davis,
158 F.3d at 1347.
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test, the physical injury requirement ceases to function merely as a
limitation on remedies or as a jurisdictional mandate that would require
prisoners to file their claims in state courts. It is as if Davis has painted
certain rights out of the constitutional landscape 5
The Davis approach has broad potential to affect rights outside the
privacy context. For example, even if Bynum's disclosure of Davis's HIV
status was not a malicious infliction of mental pain for Eighth Amendment
purposes, the court's opinion has serious implications for Eighth
Amendment cases.26 Though most violations of the Eighth Amendment
result in physical injuries, the Supreme Court held in Hudson v.
McMillian27 that courts must focus less on the severity of the injury suffered
than on "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." " Case
reporters are filled with examples of one-time constitutional violations that
do not involve physical injury.29 Davis would suggest that cases alleging
25. Following Davis, state courts may decline to hear any of these claims. Arizona, which
enacted its own prisoner litigation statute before the PLRA, has a physical injury requirement that
limits all claims, including those for equitable relief. See ARIz. STAT. ANN. § 31-201.01(L).
Prisoners will still be able to file claims in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but if the right at
issue is no longer cognizable, there will not be a § 1983 claim. See, e.g., Luczak v. Cooper, No.
98-C6807, 1999 WL 91893, at *4 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1999) (suggesting in dicta that
psychological torture may no longer be a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim because of the
physical injury requirement); Ellis v. Illinois, No. 96-C5268, 1997 WL 51502, at *3.4 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 4, 1997) (citing the requirement to call into question prior case law holding that the
deliberate infliction of mental pain can violate the Eighth Amendment). Luczak and Ellis are
hardly authoritative; after all, "Congress... has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power
to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct.
2157, 2164 (1997). But Davis comes close to ajudicial reworking of constitutional rights.
26. Regardless of the merits of Davis's claim, the court's opinion assumes that Davis suffered
a violation of a fundamental constitutional right. See Davis, 158 F.3d at 1345. At least three
Eighth Amendment cases have already cited Davis. See Robinson v. Page, No. 96-4239, 1999 WL
138746, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999); Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 808
& n.6 (10th Cir. 1999); James v. Reno, No. Civ. A. 98-1750 (RWR), 1999 WL 156343, at *4
(D.D.C. Mar. 11, 1999).
27. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
28. Id.at 7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). Although physical injury
is an important factor in this determination, it is not crucial:
That is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal
cause of action.... The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual"
punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of
physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort "repugnant to the
conscience of mankind."
Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Justice
Blackmun's concurrence provides a widely cited example of an actionable non-physical injury,
that of a "guard placing a revolver in inmate's mouth and threatening to blow prisoner's head
off." Id.at 16 (referring to the facts alleged in Wisniewsld v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276, 1278 (5th
Cir. 1990)).
29. See, e.g., Chandler v. D.C. Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 1355, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding that an inmate stated a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation where a guard
threatened to kil him); Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1996) ("To require a
threshold showing of an 'objective' injury, the sort of thing that might reveal itself on an x-ray, or
in missing teeth, or in a bruised and battered physical appearance, would confer immunity from
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great harm without physical injury can be dismissed because most Eighth
Amendment claims happen to involve a physical injury or are remedied by
injunctive relief. Acts universally recognized as repugnant would go
unpunished.
The Davis court blurs the distinction made in Zehner v. Trigg between
cases in which damages are one of many potential remedies and cases in
which damages are essential to vindicate a fundamental right. A proper
application of the Zehner logic and of the "direct and substantial" test cited
in Davis would mandate strict scrutiny of the physical injury requirement as
it relates to violations of fundamental rights that cannot be remedied by
prospective relief. Otherwise, as courts continue to interpret the physical
injury requirement, Davis would stand for the perverse result that many of
the claims screened out are those alleging the most outrageous conduct by

prison officials.
-Daniel J. Sharfstein

claims of deliberate indifference on sadistic guards, since it is possible to inflict substantial and
prolonged pain without leaving any 'objective' traces on the body of the victim."); Williams v.
Boles, 841 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Many things-beating with a rubber truncheon, water
torture, electric shock, incessant noise, reruns of 'Space 1999'-may cause agony as they occur
yet leave no enduring injury. The state is not free to inflict such pains without cause just so long
as it is careful to leave no marks."); Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 603, 605 (6th Cir. 1986)
(finding an Eighth Amendment violation where a prison guard threatened a paraplegic prisoner
with a knife, put food just out of reach, and let him sit for hours in his own feces).
30. Note how the Senate defined torture when it ratified the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, S.TREATY DOC.
No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85:
[In order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to
prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from: (1)the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or
application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality; (3) the
threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses of personality.
136 CONG. REc. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). An amicus brief proposes that courts
should read the physical injury requirement narrowly to avoid the abrogation of treaty obligations
for the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. See Brief for
Amicus Curiae Law Professors, Harris v. Garner (1lth Cir. argued Mar. 15, 1999) (No. 98-8899)
(available at <http:lldiana.law.yale.eduldianaldb/l 10998-2.html>).

